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1. Introduction
Questions related to the law applicable to cross-border consumer contracts have long been subject to ongo-
ing discussions for the European legislator and in academic circles. As is well known, Article 6 (2) of the 
Rome I Regulation*1, which lays down harmonised confl ict rules for the EU, provides that even if the parties 
to a consumer contract have agreed that a particular system of law is to be applied, such choice may not 
deprive consumers of the protection aﬀ orded to them by the mandatory provisions of their state of habitual 
residence. This means, for instance, that an owner of a web-shop wishing to sell its products in all member 
states has to consider the mandatory consumer protection provisions of 29 individual legal orders. It was 
precisely this problem that the proposal for a Common European Sales Law – now already legal history 
itself – was an attempt to solve.*2 
Much less attention has been given to the confl ict-of-laws provisions contained in various EU consumer 
directives. Article 6 (2) of the Unfair Terms Directive,*3 for example, stipulates that member states shall 
take the necessary measures to ensure that the consumer does not lose the protection granted by that direc-
tive by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-EU-member country as the law applicable to the contract if the 
consumer has a close connection with the territory of the relevant member state. Similar rules on confl ict 
of laws are set forth by Article 12 (2) of the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services Directive,*4 
Article 7 (2) of the Consumer Sales Directive,*5 and Article 22 (4) of the Consumer Credit Directive.*6 Those 
* This article was prepared within the framework of the project EMPɳɱɶ and ESF Grant No. ɺɳɱɺ.
ɲ Regulation (EC) No. ɶɺɴ/ɳɱɱɹ of the European Parliament and of the Council of ɲɸ June ɳɱɱɹ on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I). – OJ L ɲɸɸ, ɵ.ɸ.ɳɱɱɹ, p. ɷ ﬀ . For general commentary on Article ɷ of Rome I, see, for 
example, F. Ragno. Article ɷ. – F. Ferrari (ed.). Rome I Regulation. Sellier European Law Publishers ɳɱɲɶ, p. ɳɱɹ ﬀ . – DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɶɲɶ/ɺɸɹɴɹɷɷɶɴɺɸɹɶ.
ɳ Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law, COM (ɳɱɲɲ) ɱɷɴɶ fi nal, preamble p. ɴ.
ɴ Council Directive ɺɴ/ɲɴ/EEC of ɶ April ɲɺɺɴ on unfair terms in consumer contracts. – OJ L ɱɺɶ, ɳɲ.ɵ.ɲɺɺɴ, p. ɳɺ ﬀ . 
ɵ Directive ɳɱɱɳ/ɷɶ/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of ɳɴ September ɳɱɱɳ concerning the distance mar-
keting of consumer fi nancial services and amending Council Directive ɺɱ/ɷɲɺ/EEC and Directives ɺɸ/ɸ/EC and ɺɹ/ɳɸ/
EC. – OJ L ɳɸɲ, ɺ.ɲɱ.ɳɱɱɲ, p. ɲɷ ﬀ .
ɶ Directive ɲɺɺɺ/ɵɵ/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of ɳɶ May ɲɺɺɺ on certain aspects of the sale of 
 consumer goods and associated guarantees. – OJ L ɲɸɲ, ɸ.ɸ.ɲɺɺɺ, p. ɲɳ ﬀ .
ɷ Directive ɳɱɱɹ/ɵɹ/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of ɳɴ April ɳɱɱɹ on credit agreements for consumers 
and repealing Council Directive ɹɸ/ɲɱɳ/EEC. – OJ L ɲɴɴ, ɳɳ.ɶ.ɳɱɱɹ, p. ɷɷ ﬀ .
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provisions have been transposed into national law: in Estonia, by §53 (1), §237 (2), and §403 (6) of the 
Law of Obligations Act (LOA)*7 and in Germany, by EGBGB, Article 46b*8. By contrast, the new Consumer 
Rights Directive*9 does not contain a separate confl ict-of-laws provision, referring all questions of deter-
mining whether the consumer retains the protection granted by the directive in situations wherein the law 
applicable to the contract is that of a third country to Rome I.*10 It has been debated in legal writing whether 
the need for such directive-based confl ict-of-laws rules remains at all.*11
What is more, Estonian directive-based confl ict rules – but also Italian ones, for that matter*12 – raise the 
question of whether those provisions are faithful to their European model (that is to say, whether the provi-
sions of the directives have been correctly implemented in the national laws). In addition, further clarifi cation 
is needed as to their relationship with Articles 6 and 9 of Rome I. In particular, a question arises as to whether 
such national confl ict rules could be considered over riding mandatory provisions of Estonian law in the sense 
intended with Article 9 (1) of Rome I, meaning that they could be applied automatically, or whether a judge 
should conduct comparison in each case to determine which solution would be more advantageous to the con-
sumer – be it the application of Article 6 (2) of Rome I or the national directive-based rule on confl ict of laws.
Let us illustrate the question with the following example. Suppose that a credit provider situated in 
Germany advertises its credit products in Estonian media. Suppose further that a consumer residing in 
 Estonia concludes a consumer credit agreement with the German credit provider via the Internet and 
accepts its standard terms. Assume that according to the standard terms, the consumer has to pay 40 euros 
as a contract fee and another clause of the standard terms provides that German law is applicable to the 
credit agreement. Under German law, such a contract-fee clause is unfair and void.*13 This means that the 
consumer would not be obliged to pay the fee, and even if he had already paid it, he could reclaim it under 
the unjust-enrichment regime. According to the LOA,*14 however, Estonian rules on unfair contract terms 
should be applied. Under Estonian law, such standard terms have never been considered unfair, and there-
fore the credit provider’s claim for contract fees would be justifi ed. One can see from this that the applica-
tion of German law would be more advantageous to the consumer than application of Estonian law. There-
fore, the question arises of which provision should prevail in eﬀ orts to determine the applicable law: Article 
6 (2) of Rome I or the national directive-based confl ict-of-laws rule? Or should a judge apply the preferen-
tial approach and determine fi rstly which law would lead to a more consumer-friendly outcome? Given that 
similar questions have also been raised in other member states, this article is intended to  contribute to the 
development of European consumer confl ict law.
2. Is there continuing need for confl ict-of-laws rules 
that stem from consumer-related directives?
The question of the continuous need for confl ict-of-laws rules stemming from consumer-related directives 
remains unclear, given that Rome I already contains a multilateral consumer-protecting rule on confl ict of 
ɸ Võlaõigusseadus. – RT I, ɸ.ɸ.ɳɱɲɶ, ɲɴ.
ɹ Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche, ɲɹ August ɲɹɺɷ, BGBl. I.S. ɳɵɺɵ, BGBl. I.S. ɳɱɲɱ, ɳɱɲɳ.
ɺ Directive ɳɱɲɲ/ɹɴ/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of ɳɶ October ɳɱɲɲ on consumer rights, amending 
Council Directive ɺɴ/ɲɴ/EEC and Directive ɲɺɺɺ/ɵɵ/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Coun-
cil Directive ɹɶ/ɶɸɸ/EEC and Directive ɺɸ/ɸ/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. – OJ L ɴɱɵ, ɳɳ.ɲɲ.ɳɱɲɲ, 
p. ɷɵ ﬀ . The same applies for the new proposal for a Directive on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital 
content, COM (ɳɱɲɶ) ɷɴɵ fi nal.
ɲɱ Recital ɶɹ of the Consumer Rights Directive (see Note ɺ).
ɲɲ S. Leible. Article ɷ Rome I and confl ict of laws in EU Directives. – Journal of European Consumer and Market Law ɳɱɲɶ/ɲ–ɳ, 
p. ɴɺ.
ɲɳ F. Ragno (see Note ɲ), p. ɳɵɶ.
ɲɴ Decision of the German Supreme Court of ɲɴ.ɶ.ɳɱɲɵ – XI ZR ɵɱɶ/ɲɳ. BGH NJW ɳɱɲɵ, ɳɵɳɱ.
ɲɵ Subsection ɴɷ (ɳ) of the LOA stipulates: ‘If the other party to a contract with standard terms is a consumer whose residence is 
in Estonia or in a member state of the European Union and the contract was entered into as a result of a public oﬀ er, adver-
tisement or other such activity in Estonia or the contract is essentially related to the territory of Estonia for any other reason, 
the provisions of this Division apply even if the place of business of the party supplying the terms or, if no place of business 
exists, the residence or seat of such party is not in Estonia, regardless of which state’s law is applicable to the contract.’ For 
an in-depth analysis of the provision, see I. Kull. Section ɴɷ. – P. Varul, I. Kull (eds). Võlaõigusseadus I. Kommenteeritud 
väljaanne. Juura ɳɱɱɷ.
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laws in its Article 6 that, in addition to a wider scope of application in respect of the types of contracts cov-
ered as compared to its predecessor (Article 5 of the Rome Convention*15), also has facilitated the applica-
tion of requirements related to the circumstances under which a contract is concluded.*16 Nevertheless, as 
is stated in its Article 23, Rome I does not prejudice the application of provisions of Community law that 
lay down confl ict-of-laws rules related to contractual obligations in relation to particular matters, which 
those consumer-related-directive-based provisions certainly constitute. It has been argued that, although 
Article 23 prioritises expressis verbis the provisions of Community law, the imple menting legislation is lent 
its Community status by the directives those provisions are based on.*17 Therefore, it appears that with the 
entry into force of Rome I, the European legislator did not intend the specifi c consumer confl ict-of-laws 
rules to lose applicability, even though these rules might initially have been drawn up to complement the 
somewhat lesser consumer protection regime and scope of application under the Rome Convention.*18 
It can be debated, however, whether the practical need to retain the specifi c consumer-oriented con-
fl ict-of-laws provisions stemming from directives side by side with the rules already incorporated in Rome 
I really remains. The question arises especially since Rome I already creates a coherently drafted system of 
protection,*19 wherein Article 6 is complemented by non-consumer-specifi c Articles 3 (4) and 9 (2), which 
guarantee, respectively, the application of mandatory provisions of Community law for purely intra-EU 
cases (in which all elements relevant to the contract are located in the EU) and the application of overrid-
ing mandatory provisions of the forum state.*20 Indeed, the protection granted to consumers under Rome I 
can hardly be considered unsatisfactory. On the contrary, it has even been called ‘a bit too generous’.*21 In 
addition to these considerations, it is noteworthy that the replacement of a specifi c confl ict-of-laws provi-
sion with the sole reference to Rome I in the new Consumer Rights Directive seems to point to a decline in 
the need for incorporating specifi c confl ict-of-laws rules into consumer directives and, thereby, enshrining 
them in national laws. 
In order to determine whether a practical use for the specifi c confl ict-of-laws rules proceeding from 
consumer-related directives remains, the question of whether these provisions really do grant consum-
ers extended protection when compared to the general rules set forth in Rome I needs to be addressed. 
The answer to this seems to be in the aﬃ  rmative, since, notwithstanding the expanded protection of the 
consumer against an adverse choice of law in Article 6 (2) of Rome I, various types of consumer contracts 
are still expressis verbis excluded from the scope of its application.*22 In addition, the ‘mobile’ or ‘holiday-
ing’*23 consumer who concludes a contract abroad with a trader, seated abroad, that does not pursue any 
activities in the consumer’s country or direct activities to that country remains unprotected under Article 
6. Consequently, it can be argued that only certain types of consumer contracts concluded under certain 
conditions are protected under Article 6 of Rome I.*24 Even though Articles 3 (4) and 9 (2) may complement 
ɲɶ Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations of June ɲɺɹɱ. The consolidated text of the convention is found 
in OJ C ɴɴɵ, ɴɱ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɱɶ, p. ɲ ﬀ .
ɲɷ See Articles ɷ (ɵ) and ɷ (ɲ) of Rome I, respectively.
ɲɸ F. Ragno (see Note ɲ), pp. ɳɵɶ–ɳɵɷ, L.M. van Bochove. Overriding mandatory rules as a vehicle for weaker party protection 
in European private international law. – Erasmus Law Review ɸ (ɳɱɲɵ) / ɴ, para. ɵ.ɲ. As the provisions of the directives can 
be viewed as provisions of Community law that lay down confl ict-of-laws rules related to contractual obligations in relation 
to particular matters in the sense of Article ɳɴ of Rome I, the same status can be transferred to the implementing provisions 
in national laws. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɶɶɶɴ/ELR.ɱɱɱɱɴɱ.
ɲɹ See also E. Čikara. Gegenwart und Zukunft der Verbraucherkreditverträge in der EU und in Kroatien. Berlin: LIT Verlag 
ɳɱɲɱ, p. ɵɹɹ.
ɲɺ See K. Thorn. Eingriﬀ snormen. – F. Ferrari, S. Leible (eds). Ein neues Internationales Vertragsrecht für Europa – Der 
Vorschlag für eine Rom I-Verordnung. Jenaer Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft ɳɱɱɸ, p. ɲɵɴ.
ɳɱ The role of the above-mentioned provisions in protecting consumers will be discussed further; see Section ɵ.
ɳɲ S.C. Symeonides. Party autonomy in Rome I and II: An outsider’s perspective. – Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 
ɳɹ (ɳɱɲɱ) / ɳ, p. ɲɺɹ.
ɳɳ Article ɷ (ɵ) excludes service contracts under which the services are to be provided exclusively in a country other than that 
of the consumer’s residence, contracts related to a right in rem or in a tenancy of immovable property, contracts that pertain 
to fi nancial instruments, carriage contracts, and insurance contracts.
ɳɴ C. Bisping. Consumer protection and overriding mandatory rules in the Rome I Regulation. – J. Devenney, M. Kenny (eds). 
European Consumer Protection: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press ɳɱɲɳ, p. ɳɵɳ. – DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɲɸ/CBOɺɸɹɲɲɴɺɱɱɴɵɶɳ.ɱɲɷ.
ɳɵ See also P. de Vareilles-Sommières. L’ordre public dans les contrats internationaux en Europe: sur quelques diﬃ  cultés de 
mise en œuvre des articles ɸ et ɲɷ de la Convention de Rome du ɲɺ juin ɲɺɹɱ. – Mélanges en l’honneur de Philippe Malaurie. 
Éditions Defrénois, EJA ɳɱɱɶ, p. ɵɱɺ. 
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the consumer protection in such excluded situations to some extent, the scope of protection granted by 
the confl ict-of-laws rules of consumer directives in their specifi c areas seems wider, therefore enabling the 
aﬃ  rmation of their justifi ed existence. The latter is expected also since it follows from the logic of Rome I 
that consumer protection is to be seen as an exception to the general rule of party autonomy, whereas the 
consumer-related directives proceed fi rst and foremost from the principle of consumer protection and are 
aimed at ensuring consumer confi dence.*25 Subsequently, it is possible to view the specifi c rules on confl ict 
of laws that stem from directives as playing a gap-fi lling role*26 with respect to the gaps left by the primarily 
party-autonomy-orientated Rome I.
An important problem with the existence of the various directive-based consumer-protecting confl ict-
of-laws rules exists, however: the possibility of their diﬀ erent transposition into internal legal orders, which 
is carried out by various means and often incorrectly.*27 Unlike the targeted full harmonisation approach 
opted for in the new Consumer Rights Directive*28 and the Consum er Credit Directive,*29 the earlier con-
sumer directives were based on the principle of minimum harmonisation, thereby making it possible for 
their provisions not to be uniformly imple mented in national laws. This may create a ‘colorful bouquet’ 
of national confl ict-of-laws rules, causing unpredictability and general diﬃ  culties in their application.*30 It 
therefore would appear more reasonable to abandon the specifi c directive-based confl ict-of-laws rules gradu-
ally in favour of a uniform set of rules along the lines of the new Consumer Rights Directive. Such an approach 
would be justifi ed in light of the relatively high level of consumer protection already granted by the logic of 
Rome I, and its advantage would lie in the prevention of problems deriving from possible variations in the 
directive-based rules’ transposition into national laws.
3. Do the Estonian LOA’s confl ict-of-laws rules comply 
with the consumer-related directives?
As highlighted above, it is far from guaranteed that the provisions stemming from consumer directives are 
uniformly implemented in national laws, especially where minimum-harmonisation directives are involved. 
This has been exemplifi ed by how the Italian legislator has mishandled the implementation by stipulating 
the priority of Italian consumer protection provisions for all consumer contracts in which a choice of law 
other than Italian law has been made.*31 Indeed, the consumer-related directives foresee an obligation for 
the member states to ensure that consumers, if the contract has a close link with the territory of one or 
more member states, do not lose the protection granted by the directives by virtue of choice of the law of a 
third country to be the law applicable to the contract.*32 Therefore, the aim with the directives’ provisions 
pertaining to confl ict of laws is to prevent the possibility of escaping the protection granted to consumers by 
way of choice of the law of a non-member state when the contract is closely connected to the territory of at 
least one member state.*33 Consequently, the directive-based confl ict-of-laws provisions should not be appli-
cable if the law of a third country is designated on the basis of an objective connection.*34 The same should 
ɳɶ See, e.g., Recital ɹ of the Consumer Credit Directive (see Note ɷ).
ɳɷ In German, Lückenfüllungsfunktion; see, for instance, D. Kluth. Die Grenzen des kollisionsrectlichen Verbraucherschutzes. 
Jenaer Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft ɳɱɱɺ, p. ɴɱ.
ɳɸ See S. Sánchez Lorenzo. Choice of law and overriding mandatory rules in international contracts after Rome I. – Yearbook 
of Private International Law ɳɱɲɱ/ɲɳ, p. ɸɶ. See also F. Ragno (see Note ɲ), p. ɳɵɳ. 
ɳɹ See Article ɵ and Recital ɳ of the Consumer Rights Directive (Note ɺ). 
ɳɺ See Article ɳɳ (ɲ) and Recital ɺ of the Consumer Credit Directive (Note ɷ).
ɴɱ S. Sánchez Lorenzo (see Note ɳɸ), p. ɸɷ. For more on the term (in German, Bunter Strauss), see E. Čikara (see Note ɲɹ), 
p. ɵɹɹ, with further references.
ɴɲ Article ɲɵɴ (ɳ) of the Italian Consumer Code establishes that if the parties choose to apply any other law than that of Italy 
to a contract, consumers shall still be entitled to the basic protection aﬀ orded them by said code. Available at http://www.
consumatori.it/images/stories/documenti/Codice%ɳɱdel%ɳɱconsumo%ɳɱenglish%ɳɱversion.pdf (most recently accessed 
on ɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ). See also F. Ragno (see Note ɲ), p. ɳɵɶ.
ɴɳ See the Consumer Credit Directive (Note ɷ), Article ɳɳ (ɵ). Similar provisions, in a slightly diﬀ erent wording, are entailed 
by directives ɳɱɱɳ/ɷɶ, Article ɲɳ (ɳ), and ɲɺɺɺ/ɵɵ, Article ɸ (ɳ) (Notes ɵ and ɶ).
ɴɴ F. Ragno (see Note ɲ), p. ɳɵɲ.
ɴɵ J.-J. Kuipers. EU Law and Private International Law: The Interrelationship in Contractual Obligations. Brill Nijhoﬀ  ɳɱɲɲ, 
pp. ɳɳɲ–ɳɳɳ. – DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɷɴ/ɺɸɹɺɱɱɵɳɱɷɸɳɵ.
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apply in cases wherein a choice of law has been made in favour of the law of another member state that has 
correctly transposed the directive in question. 
What is more, it has been argued in legal literature that the principle of minimum harmonisation 
applies only on a substantive level and not at the level of confl ict of laws.*35 This would imply that the 
confl ict-of-laws rules should be fully harmonised in national legislation, leaving no leeway for the member 
states to determine the scope of application of their corresponding consumer-protection-related confl ict 
rules. Therefore, it would appear that the Italian legislator has been overzealous in implementing the con-
sumer-related directives by stretching the Community rule to an extent that distorts its purpose from the 
original one.*36 
It should be noted, for that matter, that the corresponding provisions of the Estonian LOA do not seem 
to comply with the requirements set forth in the consumer directives either. Namely, Articles 36 (2), 53 (1), 
237 (2), and 403 (6) of the LOA all stipulate that the provisions determining the rights and obligations of the 
consumer and of the trader apply to contracts with consumers residing in Estonia or the EU, if the contract 
is entered into in consequence of a public tender, advertising, or similar economic activities taking place in 
Estonia or if the contract is fundamentally linked to the territory of Estonia for any other reason, whichever 
state’s law applies to the contract.*37 The requirement foreseen in the directives of a close link with the ter-
ritory of the EU has therefore been met. Nevertheless, this cannot be said for the requirement that a choice 
of the law of a third country have been made. In fact, the LOA’s provisions do not prescribe a choice-of-law 
clause as a prerequisite for application of national consumer protection rules at all. Although the text’s 
omission of a choice-of-law clause does not change the practical application criteria for the LOA provisions 
in cases wherein the trader pursues commercial activities in or directs them to Estonia,*38 it nevertheless 
expands the application of Estonian consumer protection provisions to the – presumably rare – cases in 
which foreign law governs the contract on the basis of an objective connection but the contract also shows 
an essential link to Estonia. It appears from this that the scope of application of the Estonian law is wider 
than the protection required by the directives.*39 Added to that is the fact that, according to the confl ict-
of-laws provisions of the LOA, national consumer protection rules should be given precedence also over a 
choice of law of another member state. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the Estonian confl ict-of-laws 
rules in the LOA do not comply with the provisions of the consumer-related directives, as – similarly to the 
Italian Consumer Code – they unduly expand the set of cases wherein national consumer protection rules 
are given precedence.
From the wording of the specifi c directive-based confl ict-of-laws provisions in the LOA, it seems that 
the Estonian legislator has opted for a unifi ed approach, overlooking the diﬀ erentiation in the level of pro-
tection foreseen across the various consumer directives. To be more precise, the wording of the above-
mentioned provisions, as far as their mandatory nature is concerned, overlaps with Article 386 of the 
LOA, which was based on the previously valid Timeshare Directive.*40 However, it must be considered 
that, whereas the Timeshare directive expressly obliged the member states to ensure that whatever the law 
applicable was, the purchaser may not be deprived of the protection aﬀ orded by the directive if the immov-
able property was situated within the territory of a member state,*41 this is not the case for other consumer 
ɴɶ F. Ragno (see Note ɲ), p. ɳɵɶ.
ɴɷ Ibid. 
ɴɸ It has been noted that the aim with these provisions is to guarantee the level of protection aﬀ orded to the consumer by the 
consumer directives and to prevent the consumer being deprived of the backing of the consumer protection provisions 
through a choice of law for contracts concluded in Estonia. I. Kull (see Note ɲɵ), No. ɵ.ɳ.ɲ.
ɴɹ In such situations, Estonian law would in any case be applicable according to Article ɷ (ɲ) of Rome I when the parties have 
not specifi ed their choice of law applicable to the contract. 
ɴɺ According to the general remark in the explanatory note to the draft of the LOA (ɲɲɷ SE), all consumer protection pro-
visions that are based on directives are in full compliance with the requirements of the consumer-related directives 
(p. ɲɺɵ). Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/eelnou/ɱdɺɴɺɱea-ɺɸɵc-ɴɶab-aɷcɸ-cbɲɵɱɷɳcɴadɴ/
V%Cɴ%Bɶla%Cɴ%Bɶigusseadus/ (most recently accessed on ɲ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ). 
ɵɱ Directive ɺɵ/ɵɸ/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of ɳɷ October ɲɺɺɵ on the protection of purchasers in respect 
of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis. – OJ L 
ɳɹɱ, ɺ.ɲɱ.ɲɺɺɵ, p. ɹɴ ﬀ . This has been superseded by directive ɳɱɱɹ/ɲɳɳ/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of ɲɵ January ɳɱɱɺ on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, 
resale and exchange contracts. – OJ L ɴɴ, ɴ.ɳ.ɳɱɱɺ, p. ɲɱ ﬀ .
ɵɲ Article ɺ of the former Timeshare Directive. The new directive, ɳɱɱɹ/ɲɳɳ/EC, although referring matters of confl ict of law 
to Rome I, also obliges the member states to ensure, when the contract is closely connected with the EU, application of the 
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directives. The latter, as is shown above, are designed only to prevent a choice of law in favour of the law of a 
third country depriving consumers of the protection aﬀ orded to them by the directives, and therefore these 
are not applicable in situations wherein no choice of law is made. 
4. The relations between the confl ict-of-laws rules 
stemming from consumer-related directives and Rome I
4.1. Relations to Article 6 of Rome I
The determination of the law applicable to consumer contracts that fall within the scope of the consumer-
related directives may therefore have a diﬀ erent legal basis. As indicated above, the new Consumer Rights 
Directive does not regulate issues of confl ict of laws; it refers the matter to Rome I, in a contrast to the ‘old-
style’ consumer directives,*42 which include specifi c confl ict-of-laws rules to be implemented by the mem-
ber states. It is obviously the latter that may give rise to the question of which confl ict-of-laws rule is to be 
given priority where the applicable law could be determined either in line with Article 6 of Rome I or on the 
basis of a national confl ict-of-laws rule stemming from directives. This holds especially true since the scope 
of application of Article 6 of Rome I is so wide as to cover all types of consumer contracts also regulated by 
the consumer directives. Therefore, two conceivable approaches could be proposed.
The fi rst possibility is to take the position that the implementing confl ict-of-laws provisions should 
prevail over the general rule of Rome I in the sense of Article 23 of Rome I. However, their precedence can 
be justifi ed only if they faithfully reproduce the content of the provision of the directive. Therefore, when 
the domestic legislator has overly implemented the directives – that is, when an obvious diﬀ erence between 
the domestic rule and its European model exists, as is the case with Estonia – the forum court should apply 
Article 6 of Rome I instead and not attribute priority to the national implementing provisions in accordance 
with Article 23.*43 The latter would mean that as long as the requirements of Article 6 are met, the forum 
court should, under the preferential approach attributed to the provision,*44 apply the law that provides the 
consumer with better protection, be it the chosen law or the lex causae. The rationale behind this criterion 
is that the excessively implemented rules should not be considered Community rules, since the aim of the 
European legislator was not to rule out choosing the law of another member state.*45
Secondly, it can be argued, on the basis of the gap-fi lling role of the implementing confl ict-of-laws provi-
sions, that the mere stipulation in Article 23 that specifi c Community confl ict-of-laws rules shall prevail in 
relation to particular matters does not imply that also the implementing provisions should automatically be 
granted priority. This approach would mean that the national confl ict-of-laws rules are therefore to be con-
sidered subordinately where the prerequisites of Article 6 (1) have not been met and the protection aﬀ orded 
by Article 6 (2) proves inadequate. To enhance application of this approach, it has even been advocated 
in legal writing that the confl ict-of-laws rules set forth in consumer directives should be transposed into 
national laws only inasmuch as they extend beyond the level of protection already aﬀ orded to the consumer 
by Article 6 of Rome I.*46
In this article, we take a position in favour of the second approach. Although it would seem reasonable 
to primarily apply the specifi c confl ict-of-laws provisions as lex specialis, the obligation for the judiciary to 
protective provisions of the directive by stipulating that when the law of a third country applies to the contract, consumers 
shall not be deprived of the protection granted by the directive if the relevant immovable property is situated in a member 
state or if the trader pursues or directs commercial activities in a member state. See Article ɲɳ (ɳ) and Recital ɲɸ.
ɵɳ L.M. van Bochove (see Note ɲɸ), para. ɵ.ɲ.
ɵɴ F. Ragno (see Note ɲ), pp. ɳɵɶ–ɳɵɷ; L.M. van Bochove (see Note ɲɸ), para. ɵ.ɲ.
ɵɵ For more on the preferential/double-protection approach (in German, Günstigkeitsvergleich), see, for example, S.C. Symeo-
nides. Party autonomy in Rome I and II from a comparative perspective. – Convergence and Divergence in Private Interna-
tional Law. Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr. Schulthess ɳɱɲɱ, p. ɶɴɳ. Symeonides states that, although the double-protection rule 
may appear too generous, the other party may avoid it by simply not choosing a law other than the lex causae, as objectively 
determined under Rome I.
ɵɶ See also O. Remien. Variationen zum Thema Eingriﬀ snormen nach Art. ɺ Rom I-VO und nach Art. ɲɷ Rom II-VO unter 
Berücksichtigung neuerer Rechtsprechung zu Art. ɸ Römer Übereinkommen. – Grenzen überwinden – Prinzipien bewahren. 
Festschrift für Berndt von Hoﬀ mann. Bielefeld, Germany: Verlag Ernst und Werner Gieseking ɳɱɲɲ, p. ɴɵɱ.
ɵɷ B. Heiderhoﬀ . Art ɷ Rom I-VO. – T. Rauscher (ed.). Europäisches Zivilprozess- und Kollisionsrecht EuZPR/EuIPR. Munich: 
Sellier European Law Publishers ɳɱɲɲ, No. ɲɳ.
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prove their consistency with the directives each time they might be applicable would be excessive. Another 
advantage of this approach is that the specifi c directive-based confl ict-of-laws rules do not establish a pref-
erential approach as does Article 6 of Rome I. Finally, the second approach would also enable a gradual 
and, in practice, more simplifi ed waiver of the confl ict-of-laws rules stemming from consumer directives, 
which seems to be the trend displayed by the private international consumer contract-law directives.*47 
Therefore, we propose in this paper that the implementing rules be considered only after it has been estab-
lished that the requirements for application of Article 6 of Rome I have not been met. In practice, however, 
the national confl ict-of-laws rules stemming from the directives would remain in place, for the most part, 
for cases involving a mobile consumer, since Rome I covers other areas concurrently regulated by the con-
sumer directives, and contracts exempted from the scope of Rome I are also not regulated by the directives.
Let us now return to our hypothetical case. Employment of the latter approach would mean that the law 
applicable to the consumer credit contract should be determined on the basis of Article 6 of Rome I, leading 
to the result that, according to Article 6 (1) of Rome I, German law governs the contract, apart from the Esto-
nian law’s provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement, as set forth in Article 6 (2). Even though 
this would, in principle, lead to the application of Estonian unfair-contract-terms regulation as mandatory 
consumer protection provisions, the consumer could still be favoured on account of the preferential approach 
of Article 6 (2). This allows the judge to apply whichever law is more protective to the consumer and also to 
exploit the protection of both laws, for separate aspects of the contract, if necessary.*48 Therefore, the Esto-
nian consumer could still make use of the provisions of German law that are more advantageous than the 
Estonian rules on unfair contract terms and escape payment of the contract fee. In contrast, had we employed 
the fi rst approach, such a comparison could not have been conducted and Estonian consumer protection 
 provisions would have to have been applied notwithstanding the substantive content of the provisions. 
4.2. Whether the LOA’s confl ict-of-laws rules are to be considered 
overriding mandatory provisions in the sense of Article 9 of Rome I
It is widely agreed that the simple mandatory rules must be distinguished from the inter nationally manda-
tory rules (overriding mandatory provisions in the sense of Article 9 of Rome I).*49 Given that consumer 
protection provisions represent, in principle, simple mandatory rules that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement, the extent to which they could also be applied as overriding mandatory provisions remains 
unclear. In fact, the question of the possibility of placing consumer protection rules within the framework 
of overriding mandatory provisions is twofold. 
In the fi rst place, debate centres on the question of whether and under which circumstances the sub-
stantive consumer protection rules could be seen as embodying a public policy that is necessary for quali-
fying them as overriding mandatory provisions in the sense of Article 9 of Rome I.*50 The relationship of 
consumer protection rules to overriding mandatory provisions is not uniformly resolved either in the legal 
literature or in the judicial practice of the member states. Illustrating this, the German courts and doctrine 
do not consider those provisions with which protection of the public interest is only a refl ex of the primary 
purpose (protecting private interests) to be overriding mandatory provisions, whereas French courts have 
taken a broader approach and applied as mandatory provisions also those rules that serve to protect the 
weaker party.*51 The latter also holds true for Italian and Belgian as well as British doctrine, as the abuse 
ɵɸ See Section ɳ, above. The need to transpose confl ict rules set forth in directives has been considered outdated also by B. 
Heiderhoﬀ  (see Note ɵɸ), No. ɲɵ.
ɵɹ See Subsection ɵ.ɲ, above, and S.C. Symeonides (see Note ɵɵ), p. ɶɴɳ.
ɵɺ Recital ɴɸ of Rome I clarifi es that overriding mandatory provisions should both be distinguished from the expression of 
provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement and be construed more restrictively.
ɶɱ Article ɺ of Rome I defi nes overriding mandatory provisions as ‘provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a 
country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they 
are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under 
this Regulation’. For analysis of the concept of overriding mandatory provisions, see, for example, R. Piir. Eingreiﬀ en oder 
nicht eingreiﬀ en, das ist hier die Frage. Die Problematik der Bestimmung und des Anwendungbereichs der Eingriﬀ snormen 
im internationalen Privatrecht. – Juridica International ɳɱɲɱ/XVII, p. ɲɺɺ ﬀ , Section ɳ.
ɶɲ C. Bisping (see Note ɳɴ), p. ɳɵɶ. See also A. Bonomi. Le régime des règles impératives et des lois de police dans le réglement 
„Rome I” sur la loi applicable aux contrats. – E.C. Ritaine, A. Bonomi (eds). Le nouveau reglement européen „Rome I” relatif 
à la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles. Schulthess ɳɱɱɹ, p. ɳɳɹ.
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of weaker parties can be viewed as a threat to civil society.*52 The question therefore remains open, with 
further instructions awaited from the European Court of Justice. That being said, it can nevertheless be 
predicted that, given the widened scope of application of Article 6, the necessity of even considering Article 
9 in cases involving consumer contracts should diminish in any case.*53 
Of particular importance for purposes of this article is, on the other hand, the question of whether the 
directive-based rules in the LOA on confl ict of laws could be considered of an overriding mandatory nature, 
which the way they have been phrased would suggest. Indeed, the wording of a provision being one of 
the indications in determination of the overriding nature of a rule, theirs certainly refers to an obligatory 
nature by stipulating that the respective provisions apply regardless of which state’s law is applicable to 
the contract. In contrast, it has been argued that the consumer directives do not oblige the member states 
to transpose the confl ict-of-laws rules as overriding mandatory provisions.*54 According to some authors, 
the aim with these provisions, which have in similar contexts also been called scope rules, localising rules, 
outward confl ict rules, and Annexkollisionsnormen (in German)*55, is not even to designate the applicable 
law but to ensure the eﬀ ective application of secondary EU law – that is, to help the court of the forum to 
ascertain the sense in which a mandatory provision is mandatory.*56 This means that, in contrast to the 
multilateral confl ict-of-laws rules set forth by Rome I, the national implementing provisions are designed 
simply to ensure the standard of consumer protection set forth in the directives for all cases closely related 
to member states. Since the wording of the LOA’s confl ict-of-laws rules does not seem intended to establish 
them as overriding mandatory provisions,*57 it is submitted here that these provisions do not constitute 
overriding mandatory provisions in the sense of Article 9 of Rome I. 
In this respect, it should be noted that legal writing on consumer directives has not considered their 
confl ict rules to be overriding mandatory ones either.*58 A diﬀ erence from Article 12 (2) of the Timeshare 
Directive must, however, be emphasised: its terms have rightly been regarded as overriding mandatory 
rules since it assures consumers the protection oﬀ ered by the directive whichever system of law is appli-
cable.*59 Other consumer confl ict-of-laws provisions should nevertheless be seen as intended to be only 
domestically mandatory, as they foresee that the protection oﬀ ered by the directives cannot be avoided via 
a mere choice of law. Even the fact that the obligation to transpose the provisions addressing confl ict of laws 
has been regulated on a European level and through directives aimed at ensuring the proper functioning of 
the internal market cannot suﬃ  ce to tie these provisions to an overriding public interest.*60 
5. Conclusions
This paper has discussed the abundance and interaction of rules aimed at determining the law applicable to 
cross-border consumer contracts. It follows from the above that the level of consumer protection aﬀ orded by 
Rome I seems to allow for a waiver of the simultaneously existing directive-based confl ict rules. Such renun-
ciation would not only resolve the issue of inaccurate transposition to national laws – an apparent problem 
for the Estonian legislator as well – but also contribute to legal certainty. It has been submitted that, while 
the confl ict-of-laws rules of Rome I and the national directive-based rules coexist, the latter are only to be 
considered subordinately to Rome I. The confl ict rules of the LOA are also not to be viewed as overriding 
mandatory rules in the sense of Article 9 of Rome I; these are deemed to be only domestically mandatory.
ɶɳ A. Bonomi (see Note ɶɲ), p. ɳɳɺ; L.M. van Bochove (see Note ɲɸ), para. ɳ.ɲ; A. Nuyts. Les lois de police et dispositions impé-
ratives dans le Règlement Rome I. – Revue de Droit Commercial Belge ɳɱɱɺ/ɷ, p. ɶɶɺ. See also M. Giuliano, P. Lagarde. 
Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations. – OJ C ɳɹɳ, ɴɲ.ɲɱ.ɲɺɹɱ, p. ɲ ﬀ , p. ɳɹ, where 
consumer protection provisions are cited as an example of overriding mandatory provisions.
ɶɴ Also supported by A. Bonomi (see Note ɶɲ), p. ɳɳɳ; O. Remien (see Note ɵɶ), pp. ɴɴɷ–ɴɴɸ.
ɶɵ F. Ragno (see Note ɲ), p. ɴɴɲ
ɶɶ For the terms, see, respectively, J.-J. Kuipers (see Note ɴɵ), p. ɳɳɵ; L.M. van Bochove (see Note ɲɸ), para. ɵ; S. Sánchez 
Lorenzo (see Note ɳɸ), p. ɸɶ; and D. Kluth (see Note ɳɷ), p. ɳɺ.
ɶɷ J.-J. Kuipers (see Note ɴɵ), p. ɳɳɵ. He submits that the implementing provisions do not constitute confl ict-of-laws rules in 
the strict sense at all.
ɶɸ See Section ɴ, above.
ɶɹ See, e.g., F. Ragno (see Note ɲ), p. ɴɴɲ.
ɶɺ J.-J. Kuipers (see Note ɴɵ), p. ɳɳɴ.
ɷɱ F. Ragno (see Note ɲ), p. ɳɶɴ.
